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COMPETITION LAW FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION COMMUNITY: 
DESIGNING SHOES FOR MANY SIZES 
JOHN O. HALEY 
The articles of this inaugural volume of the Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review initially were presented at two related 
conferences on competition law within the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) community. The first conference was held in 
Victoria, British Columbia, in September 2000; the second, in Tokyo, 
Japan, in July 2001. Both were sponsored jointly by the Chuo University 
Institute of Comparative Law in Japan, the University of Victoria Centre 
for Asia-Pacific Initiatives in Canada, the Asian Law Center of the 
University of Washington in Seattle, and the Whitney R. Harris Institute 
for Global Legal Studies of Washington University in St. Louis. Neither 
conference would have been possible without the generous support of the 
Center for Global Partnership of the Japan Foundation.  
The aims of the project were twofold. We sought first to evaluate the 
current status of competition legislation in selected countries within the 
APEC community. At both meetings, the participants thus reviewed 
several of the most recent efforts to create effective regimes to promote 
competition policy within the APEC community. We considered what 
were, in effect, national reports on recent legislation in Indonesia and 
Thailand and the prospects for similar legislation in the People’s Republic 
of China.  
A second and more ambitious objective was to attempt an evaluation of 
both the most established competition law regimes in East Asia and a 
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cluster of current issues. Thus, the discussions included critiques of 
competition policy in South Korea and Taiwan. In addition, we raised 
more general concerns related to the purpose and scope of competition 
policy and implementation in East Asia and the APEC region. More 
particularized questions and concerns were directed to competition policy 
in Japan, Canada, Australia, and the United States, especially with respect 
to either particular areas such as electric power utilities, 
telecommunications, and intellectual property, or law-related issues such 
as extraterritorial enforcement and cartel exemptions. During the 
discussions, two broader, more overarching themes emerged. They are 
captured in two words: whether and what.  
The enactment of competition legislation has become a global 
phenomenon. Competition law has, in effect, become the latest fashion. To 
be someone, it appears, everyone—including the members of the APEC 
community—must have a competition statute. For some (particularly the 
countries of Central and Southeastern Europe as well as the Baltic states) 
the explanation lies in more than pure fad. To be someone means to be a 
member of the European “club” and true to the tradition of elite clubs 
everywhere. Proper dress—in this case competition legislation acceptable 
to those who run the club—is one of the prerequisites of membership.  
In this proliferation of competition laws, often scant attention is paid to 
the most basic questions. For the most part these are quite evident, but 
they still need to be articulated repeatedly. All too often they are ignored, 
taken for granted, or simply left unstated. The first question is whether a 
competition law is needed at all. All but a few advanced industrial states 
can restate this threshold question by asking whether any type of 
competition law is appropriate for countries that seek to achieve sustained 
economic growth. Even when this initial question is answered 
affirmatively (i.e. that competition policy is important and some sort of 
competition law would be beneficial), a second question is posed even 
more rarely: what kind of competition policy and legal regime for its 
implementation are then appropriate? For many countries, legislators act 
as if a competition statute without a policy is sufficient. All that seems to 
be desired is something on the books as well as the additional façade of a 
nominal enforcement authority in charge. Legislation thus is drafted and 
enacted with little attention either to the underlying policies that the law 
might have been designed to establish, or to the capacity of the country’s 
administrative and legal institutions to enforce effectively. 
One can approach the questions of whether and what from several 
perspectives. Economic analysis and comparative legislation come 
immediately to mind. Some might prefer to use an essentially historical 
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approach. They thus could point to the United States, Germany (and 
Europe), and Japan as successful examples of industrial countries with the 
oldest and, by most accounts (excluding Japan), most effective 
competition laws. The problem with such assertions is that the historical 
record is quite muddled. With some irony, we become more faithful to the 
historical experience by debating the issues of whether and what. The 
principal antitrust statutes were themselves the product of great 
uncertainty—and, initially in Germany and Japan, imposed regimes. No 
consensus existed as to the economic need or consequences of the 
legislation that these countries eventually enacted. The statutes that did 
emerge after considerable debate were products of compromise, reflecting 
political reality more than economic analysis. Nor were economic aims the 
sole, or even predominant, concern. In each case, the equally important if 
not primary objective was political. That these regimes have become 
major models is perhaps the greatest irony of all. What remains necessary 
is a careful assessment of the need for competition policy in both 
economic and political terms as well as how to design effective legislation 
to deal with the particular problems of individual countries within the 
APEC community. 
I. WHETHER—COMPETITION POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
THE GERMAN AND JAPANESE EXPERIENCE 
Whether a vigorous competition policy inhibits or restricts economic 
growth is a major concern as an increasing number of industrializing 
countries within APEC and elsewhere have begun to consider the aims and 
purposes of a vigorous competition policy. This debate is not new. The 
long and successful experiments with antitrust regulation in Germany and 
Japan began with intense debate over the propriety of a vigorous 
competition policy in economies in which economic recovery was the 
highest priority. 
Competition policy in both Germany and Japan originated in the 
presurrender planning within the U.S. Department of State for occupied 
Germany and Japan as well as the postwar international economic order. 
We are apt today to forget that the Havana Charter originally included 
detailed provisions proscribing certain restrictive practices in international 
commerce. Although only the trade provisions of the Charter survived in 
the guise of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, for Germany, 
and Europe as a whole, U.S. antitrust policy became a central feature of 
the postwar reforms.  
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The actual policies for Germany and Japan as articulated in the 
instructions to the supreme military commanders in both theaters were 
virtually identical. Major efforts for the “decartelization” and 
“deconcentration” were undertaken from the start. These policies were 
equally controversial. Although defended by the economists as 
economically beneficial, proponents and critics alike emphasized political 
aims of these policies. In the language of the occupation statutes, 
“excessive concentrations of economic power” were viewed to be 
politically harmful as significant barriers to the development and vitality 
of democratic institutions. Such populist notions long had been part and 
parcel of the domestic American antitrust experience. It therefore was 
quite natural for the American occupation authorities to view the benefits 
of decartelization and deconcentration more in political than economic 
terms. The result, however, was heated debate within the American camp 
with respect to the potential economic consequences of a rigorous 
deconcentration effort in Germany and Japan. The debate pitted those who 
emphasized the political benefits of deconcentration against those who 
feared its adverse economic effects. The proponents of German and 
Japanese economic recovery ultimately triumphed and occupation 
deconcentration efforts either ended or were reduced significantly. 
Regardless, the issues raised remained unresolved. 
The division of Germany among the four occupying powers (the 
United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France), each of which 
possessed quite different and potentially contradictory policies, prevented 
uniform implementation of competition policies throughout occupied 
Germany. In the end, however, shared interests, a common concern for 
German recovery, and the dominance of the United States enabled 
cooperation among all of the Allies except the Soviet Union. This 
cooperation led first to a U.S./U.K. bizonal economic administration and, 
ultimately, the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 
1949. For the first time since their surrender, Germans would have a voice 
in competition policy. 
The primarily German competition law (the Law Against Restraints of 
Competition, or GWB) did not reflect U.S. policies and approaches. 
Rather, it was based on the efforts that began in 1947 by a group of 
political economists supported by Ludwig Erhard, the first postwar 
economics minister of the FRG, to create a strong regulatory regime that 
was an “order of competition.” The statute as enacted in 1957 (in force 
from 1958) reflected a series of political compromises, especially its 
emphasis on policing “abuses” of market power rather than engaging in 
structural reform. Although American impetus again led to the inclusion of 
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the prohibitions of anticompetitive conduct in the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the extension of these provisions to the Treaty of Rome and 
the development of European competition law also largely was a product 
of German efforts and thinking. 
The German experience, I submit, is quite relevant for both APEC and 
other developing economies today. The intellectual forebears of German 
competition law—the ordo-liberals of the Freiburg School—viewed 
competition in constitutional terms. They emphasized both the economic 
and social goals of competition policy and did not question its role in 
fostering economic growth and the public welfare. They also understood 
that public monopoly could be as serious an evil as private monopoly. 
Similar understandings underpin Shujiro Urata’s paper on Competition 
Policy and Economic Development in East Asia. He begins by defining 
competition policy broadly to include the variety of regulatory practices 
and economic policies that affect competition. In so doing he emphasizes 
the point that competition policy should not be viewed in the restricted 
terms of a single regulatory regime. Rather, the focus of attention should 
be an array of measures that either foster or constrain firm rivalry and 
competitive markets. 
On these issues, two other contributions to this volume deserve special 
attention. The first is the essay by Hiroshi Iyori, a former secretary-general 
and member of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission. Few observers have 
more insight on the Japanese experience. The second is the analysis by 
Jiang Xiaojuan on the surprising procompetitive effects of Chinese 
industrial policy.  
Read in the context of clarifying the need for competition policy, the 
critiques of competition policy in South Korea by Kyu Uck Lee, Taiwan 
by Lawrence Liu, Thailand by Sakda Thanitcul, and Indonesia by 
Hikmahanto Juwana combine to provide further confirmation of Urata’s 
inclusive approach. Wang Xiaoye addresses the need for competition law 
in China in similarly expansive terms. However, as emphasized in her 
paper on the Prospect of Antimonopoly Legislation in China, she remains 
rather pessimistic with respect to the likelihood of legislative activity in 
the foreseeable future. 
Whether or not, or to what extent, competition policies either inhibited 
or aided economic recovery and growth in either Germany or Japan are 
equally difficult questions to answer with accuracy. The historical record 
at least does not allow any certainty. In Germany, as noted above, concern 
over economic recovery brought the U.S. deconcentration efforts to a 
standstill. The German economic “miracle” had begun long before the 
passage of the GWB in 1957.  
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In Japan, a single occupation authority and Japanese government 
continuity permitted legislation enacted by the Japanese Diet, albeit under 
supervision from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. When 
occupation ended, there thus was no need for new legislative action to 
ratify occupation regulation. Japan therefore justifiably can claim senior 
status as the country with the second oldest comprehensive competition 
law in the world. However, many would argue that competition and 
competition law played little role in Japan’s remarkable and rapid postwar 
economic recovery and growth. Irrespective of competition law, new entry 
and fierce firm rivalry were in fact salient characteristics of the Japanese 
economy throughout the 1950s and 1960s, a period usually associated with 
industrial policy, the expulsion of legal cartels, and extreme protectionism. 
What needs to be underscored is that without government-imposed 
barriers to entry and government-enforced cartels, the Japanese economy 
would have been even more competitive. From these perspectives, once 
more the observations of Hiroshi Iyori on the lessons of Japanese 
economic development and the relationships between competition policy 
and government intervention in postwar Japan, as well as the less sanguine 
concerns raised by Walter Hatch in his paper on Japanese production 
networks in Southeast Asia, become even more telling.  
II. WHAT—MODELS FOR COMPETITION LAW IN THE APEC COMMUNITY 
The question of what competition law remains. Four regulatory 
regimes for competition policy—the United States, Japan, Germany, and 
the European Community—have become the principal models for global 
emulation and adaptation. The influence of American law as a model is 
notable in both Australia and Japan. Japanese law and German law both 
provided the primary models for the South Korean legislation. In addition, 
as Sakda Thanitcul notes, Korean law was in turn a source for Thai 
legislation. German and Japanese law also influenced the competition 
legislation adopted for Taiwan. The influence of all four regimes is evident 
in recent legislation enacted in Indonesia. Yet, as the articles included here 
demonstrate, none of these four dominant legal regimes should be 
considered an adequate model.  
All four regimes were established in unique historical contexts. None 
represented a carefully planned or clearly articulated set of coherent 
policies; rather, each reflected a variety of compromises and political 
adjustments necessary for their enactment as national legislation or, as a 
matter of treaty law in the case of European law, member country 
acceptance. Nor were any of the four designed for economies and political 
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systems that do not share the particular features of an advanced industrial 
democracy. Competition law came into being in the United States, Japan, 
Germany, and Europe as a whole only after a strong private sector had 
developed. We do not need to either fully assess the relative strength of 
public and private actors nor determine the extent to which government 
intervention affected economic performance in order to recognize that the 
economic vigor of the private sectors in these countries was not 
completely dependent on industrial policy and government support at the 
time of the enactment of the countries’ respective competition laws. 
No claims of universality, inherent superiority or, what might be called, 
a priori preference thus can be made for any of these regimes. 
Accordingly, justification for the use of European law as a model for 
countries currently within the European Community, as well as those 
seeking to join, rests solely on a preference for uniformity within the 
Community. The E.C. competition law regime is not on its face any better 
or more appropriate for any member country than, say, German law, or 
even Japanese law for that matter. These observations lead to a third 
observation: no judgments may be reached properly on which, if any, 
“model” of competition law is appropriate without careful evaluation of 
the aims of the regime being considered, as well as the mechanisms for 
their effective implementation. 
Historically, competition policy has had two primary objectives—one 
economic, the other political. The standard economic justification of 
competition policy has been to promote economic efficiency, which, it is 
argued, is jeopardized by any exercise of the power to determine prices in 
the market. By eliminating the acquisition of “monopoly power” or its 
exercise, competition policy thus promotes the efficient allocation of 
economic resources and thereby contributes to the maximization of 
economic welfare. From a purely economic viewpoint any exercise of 
monopoly power produces unwanted consequences. The question of who 
exercises the power is largely irrelevant. That issue is central, however, to 
the second category, the political or social aims of competition policy.  
Often expressed rather crudely by the phrase “big business is bad,” the 
political justifications for competition policy were at the core of the 
American postwar efforts to create competition policy regimes in both 
Germany and Japan. Deconcentration and decartelization policies were 
understood to be essential components of the American “democratization” 
policies in both countries. These policies, as well as the revitalization of 
antitrust enforcement in the United States under Thurman Arnold, 
reflected a largely American mix of Marxist and free market ideas. The 
American New Deal left as being accepted the Marxist proposition that 
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fascism in Germany and Japan was the product of an industrial-military 
alliance. The antitrust reformers viewed the concentrated industries of 
Germany—the Krupps and I.G. Farbens—as well as the zaibatsu in Japan 
as partners in international military aggression. However, unlike European 
socialists, they did not view economic concentration as the inexorable 
final phase of “monopoly capitalism” to be welcomed as the precondition 
for nationalization.  
The American antitrust reformers in Germany, Japan, and at home in 
the United States believed that competitive markets with multiple private 
rivals also were fundamental to the development of democratic political 
processes. Nevertheless, they did not fear government intervention in the 
economy and tended to favor, or at least condone, some public 
monopolies. The evil was private—not public—monopoly power and 
profits. For the countries in APEC it therefore is important, I believe, to 
clarify at the outset which of these two clusters of goals—or both—are 
intended. On the answer hinges much of the policy choices that have to be 
made. 
Such an evaluation of aims or objectives requires at the outset the 
collection of accurate and comprehensive data on the industrial structure 
and the political, legal, and administrative capacities of the country or 
community in which the regime is to operate. Equally important is an 
objective and realistic assessment of what might best be called the 
“conditions of competition” and the “conditions of enforcement” in that 
country or community. To create a regulatory regime for competition 
policy without such data and assessment is almost certain to lead to 
unintended and potentially undesirable outcomes. One may well question, 
for example, the applicability of the Japanese experience with technology 
standards (as described by Eriko Watanabe) to less industrialized countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region.  
At this point, we know too little to begin to suggest in any detail the 
features for effective competition law in the APEC community. 
Nonetheless, some rebuttable assertions seem warranted by the data we do 
have. Each of the papers presented at the Victoria and Tokyo conferences 
and collected here provides valuable information and insights. These allow 
a number of tentative conclusions. Additional support may be found in the 
overall Taiwan experience as detailed by Lawrence Liu as well as the three 
comparative studies. Toshiaki Takigawa examines American, British, and 
Japanese regulatory approaches for introducing competition into 
previously monopolistic public utility industries. William Neilson, Robert 
Howell, and Suichiro Kozuka jointly offer an analysis of the relationships 
between competition law and intellectual property in Canada, Japan, and 
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the United States. In the third comparative study, Jacqueline Bos details 
differences and similarities of the exemption of specific anticompetitive 
conduct under American, Australian, European, and Japanese law. Finally, 
Dorsey Ellis, Naoaki Okatani, and Mitsuo Matsushita each add 
information on the mechanics and strategies of enforcement, as well as the 
current status and problems of efforts for international cooperation.  
In other words, we know enough about the “conditions of competition” 
and “enforcement” in some of the member-countries of APEC at least to 
suggest some of the main concerns that an effective competition regime 
should address.  
Excluding the United States and Japan for purposes of this analysis 
because they are best treated separately, the APEC countries fit into six 
broad categories: (1) the predominately English-speaking, common-
countries states of North America and the South Pacific—i.e., Australia, 
Canada (with apologies to Quebec), and New Zealand; (2) South Korea 
and Taiwan, the two newly industrialized economies of East Asia; (3) the 
developing countries of Southeast Asia—i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand; (4) the economically “liberalized” socialist countries of East 
Asia—i.e., China and Vietnam; (5) the Latin American countries of North, 
Central, and South America—represented, for our purposes here, by Chile 
and Mexico, and (6) the “city-states” of Singapore and Hong Kong.  
Along with the United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 
share a cultural and institutional experience forged largely during early to 
mid-nineteenth century British rule. Along with the United States, the 
three represent the “western” countries of APEC. All have well-
established political institutions and market economies. In addition, as we 
might expect, all have equally well-established competition laws that 
largely reflect blended borrowings from the United States and the United 
Kingdom adapted to indigenous political and economic conditions.  
They also are similar in economic structure and per capita income. All 
three are quite prosperous with per capita incomes almost equal to Japan. 
They have vigorous primary industries (agriculture, forestry, and mining). 
In this respect, they have much in common with Chile. Indeed, 
collectively with Chile, the combined population (sixty-seven million) is 
slightly larger than Thailand (sixty-one million), but slightly less than the 
combined population of South Korea and Taiwan (sixty-nine million). All 
four (including Chile) are small, mineral rich, agricultural countries. Each 
also has a vigorously competitive market economy reinforced by at least a 
relatively effective competition law.  
Because of their size and the apparent lack of any serious competitive 
restraints in their economies, these three regimes too often are left out of 
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discussions on APEC competition law, except as potential sources for 
models, policies, and practices to emulate. This is unfortunate because I 
believe that in so doing we are ignoring, first and foremost, meaningful 
examples of contextual adaptation of competition law; that is, how 
competition policies can be crafted consciously and implemented to 
achieve desired outcomes after taking into account local economic and 
political conditions. Each of these countries also has something special to 
teach us about the application of competition policy in economies 
dominated by agriculture, forestry, and mining, and in which foreign 
investment has played a significant role in economic development.  
The countries in Group Two—South Korea and Taiwan—also have 
established (albeit relatively recent) competition legislation. As the two 
newest industrialized countries in East Asia, they seem to have much in 
common. The peoples of both countries developed historically within the 
cultural and political orbit of imperial China. They both experienced 
economic and institutional transformation under Japanese colonial rule. 
Finally, they both exemplify the much touted proposition that economic 
growth in market-driven economies not only produces wealth but also 
leads to the emergence of democratic political institutions and processes—
a widely shared view, especially within circles that view China’s 
economic growth and increased participation in the global economy with 
great favor.  
South Korea and Taiwan also share a common feature in industrial 
structure that differs markedly from Japan but is equally evident in other 
Asian economies: the exclusivity of family-controlled firms. All private 
businesses in both countries are family-owned. Even the chaebols in 
Korea or the businesses that constitute the largest manufacturing networks 
in Taiwan are family-owned. In neither country have managerial functions 
become separated from ownership as they have in the United States, 
Japan, and the other “advanced” industrial economies of Western Europe 
(as well as the countries listed in Group One).  
Despite these and other similarities, critical aspects of the political 
economies of South Korea and Taiwan remain very different. These 
differences appear to have influenced the levels of concentration and the 
conditions of competition significantly in the two countries. In South 
Korea, the national government under General Park Chung Hee pursued 
an industrial policy modeled on the Japanese experience. The government 
encouraged the creation of the zaibatsu-like chaebol. It ensured targeted 
industries access to capital, promoted their exports, and protected them 
from competition by foreign entries into South Korean markets. 
Reinforced by Korean patterns of kinship and authority, a lineage-based 
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class hierarchy is said to have emerged in South Korea. In Taiwan, in 
contrast, government intervention in the economy was far less directive. 
Although the Taiwan government encouraged exports and pursued 
protectionist policies, the government’s role in the economy was more 
passive. Moreover, very different patterns of kinship and economic 
interaction developed in Taiwan as non-kinship ties in business became 
increasingly important, producing competitive tensions within kinship 
groupings. Taiwan, as a result, appears to have less industrial 
concentration and more inter-firm rivalry than South Korea. 
For purposes of competition policy, the countries in the three 
remaining categories—the three largest “developing” countries of 
Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand), the “economically 
liberalizing” socialist states (China and Vietnam), and the APEC 
community’s Latin American members (especially Mexico)—can be 
considered together. Each confronts challenges and problems common to 
the others. In the 1980s, all of them began to institute a remarkably similar 
set of institutional reforms to create freer and more open economic 
markets. Like their more industrialized peers, they too began to 
“deregulate” and “privatize” their economies. Competition legislation thus 
is viewed in each of these countries to be an important component of these 
reforms. However, unlike the political economies of the countries in each 
of the previously described groups, these countries share deeply embedded 
traditions of active government (or patrimonial ruler) participation in the 
economy. None have developed fully a vigorous and independent private 
sector. In short, none has an established economic market free from active 
government intervention favoring particular economic players. In addition, 
none of these countries has established either an administrative or judicial 
system manifestly able to implement effectively and fairly a legal regime 
either designed to promote firm rivalry based on consumer rather than 
political preferences or intended to foster democratic processes by 
reducing the influence of concentrated wealth. The countries within the 
APEC community that seem to have best overcome, or at least be in the 
process of moving beyond, such legacies are Singapore, South Korea, and 
Chile. Thus, they deserve the closest comparative attention.  
Given the role of government in the economy and the lack of an 
effective, efficient, and, above all, corruption-free regulatory and juridical 
infra-structure, the competition law regimes that now exist on the books or 
are being planned are almost certain to fail. Instead of enabling or 
fostering new entry and firm rivalry, the regulatory tools of these new 
regimes are far more likely to be manipulated in favor of politically-
favored firms and industries. Competition law itself is apt under these 
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conditions to create additional regulatory barriers to innovation by the 
most efficient incumbent firms and to hinder new entry. From these 
observations at least a few general recommendations seem warranted. 
1. Competition policy for the liberalizing countries in the APEC 
community should aim first and foremost at government measures that 
reduce competition rather than private anticompetitive conduct. Ideally, 
those responsible for the enforcement of competition policy should have 
the means and will to identify and eliminate at least the most pernicious 
governmental barriers to new entry, especially regulatory barriers that by 
design or effect protect incumbent firms from potential rivals. In 
particular, enforcement authorities should be able to intervene to curtail 
government licensing controls and other regulatory measures that either 
create barriers to entry or enable the exercise of monopoly power or the 
abuse of market domination.  
2. Competition legislation should be drafted to establish clear rules and 
precise standards of conduct. To the extent possible, legislators should 
avoid ambivalent or broad delegations of administrative or judicial 
discretion. Per se prohibitions of anticompetitive conduct with manifest 
harm to consumers are preferable to “rules of reason” left to discretionary 
“case-by-case” administrative or judicial determination.  
3. Positive government actions should be taken to ensure the 
availability of capital to new entrepreneurial endeavors based on an 
objective economic assessment of risk as well as effective legal and 
administrative mechanisms for terminating failed ventures. 
4. An independent Competition Enforcement Authority should be 
established with a professional staff that includes personnel trained in law 
as well as economics. The Authority should have responsibility to review 
any dealings between competitors, including patent and other intellectual 
property transfers, that presumptively could affect competition by 
reducing the capacity for entry by potential rivals.  
5. Vertical restraints—including, for a limited duration, resale 
maintenance—by new entrants into a national market, including new entry 
by established foreign firms, should be treated as presumptively valid. 
6. Some form of multilateral cooperation, especially with the 
established competition enforcement authorities, should be developed to 
enable a coordinated approach to merger control as well as conduct by 
multinational corporate enterprises and firm networks that reduces new 
entry within foreign markets. 
In conclusion, the development of a shared competition policy within 
the APEC community is neither feasible nor desirable. Rather, national 
and regional efforts should be directed primarily toward both the 
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identification of existing barriers to entry (and other public as well as 
private impediments to effective market competition) and the development 
of effective remedial measures. APEC community structures should be 
involved in these tasks by providing fora in which problems that are 
common to most, if not all, countries in the region can be analyzed and 
effective solutions can be articulated. 
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